Epiphenomenalism a retrospective analysis Essay

Epiphenomenalism a retrospective analysis - Essay Example It suggests that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but in turn, the mental event has no effects upon the physical events. Epiphenomenalists argue that behaviour is a result of muscular activity resultant from neural impulses and that these impulses are triggered by other impulses that are inputs from the senses. Thus the mind has no role to play in human behavior. Huxley himself compared the mental events to the steam horns that are fitted on a steam locomotive. He said that they play no vital role on the functioning of the steam engine. Mental phenomena according to him cannot create anymore impact on the physical plain anymore than a shadow can create impacts on the footsteps of the person. All mental events can be broadly divided in to two categories according to their nature. The first one comprises of phenomenal experiences such as pain, qualia after images and tastes etc. The second kind of mental events comprises of occurent propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires. Arguments on epiphenomenalism can concern both types of mental events and one cannot give solid evidence to its sanctity on both levels. The two types of mental events can be connected provided we assume that we have our qualia. Thus if we assume that pains have no physical effects, we could infer that (i) pains do not cause the belief that we are in pain and (ii) beliefs that we are in pain is epiphenomenal. Since if we believe that we are in pain and it leads us to some response (even indirectly) having an effect on the physical plane, then we would have to affirm that the whole proposition of epiphenomena is nothing but absurd because according to the theory, the feeling that we are in pain should have no consequence to events in our physical world. The logic though lies in the premise that events in the physical world have sufficient causes in the physical world and if men tal events were real and separate from physical events, then it would require a violation of physical law. The interactionist model proposed that the pineal gland undergoes changes according to mental events and brings about physical changes. But epiphenomena denies the involvement of any mental events and hence such physical changes of the pineal gland should have to be explained by events in the physical plane. It explicitly states that there will be no such change in the gland until a physical force would cause it to change. This is where epiphenomena disappoint us once more. Its rigidity and lack of accommodative capacity for new findings leave us with no option, but to sideline it and look for a better theory. Other arguments that are contrary to the standing of epiphenomena include the theory of natural selection. For that theory to stand, it should explain the development of consciousness. But a property by which a selection can occur in a species is relevant only when particular thoughts have effects upon specific behavior patterns. Therefore it is imperative that the conscious and the qualia should alter the course of behaviour in the physical world - quite contrary to what epiphenomenalism states. We all know that natural selection is a reality whether we like it or not and hence as a consequence epiphenomenalism fails to stand ground. It also contradicts the existence of other minds. But we do know that